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  The Blinder Oaxaca decomposition method for defining discrimination from the wage 
equations of two groups has had a wide degree of application.  However, the implication of 
this measure can very dramatically depending on the definition of the non-discriminatory 
wage chosen for comparison.  This paper uses a form of extreme bounds analysis to define the 
limits on the measure of discrimination that can be obtained from these decompositions.  A 
simple application is presented to demonstrate the use of the bootstrap to define the 
distributions of the discrimination measure. 
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0. Introduction 
A rich literature on the empirical analysis of labor market discrimination has followed 
from the contributions of  Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).  These researchers were among 
the first to explore this issue econometrically.  It has been understood for some time that the 
dichotomy in the average wages of two groups (usually broken down by sex or race and here 
referred to as the advantaged and the disadvantaged) is due in part to differences in average 
levels of productivity (or skill) (their endowment) and is due in part to disparate treatment of 
the two groups once they enter the labor market (the discrimination).  However, the 
decomposition of the average wage differences into these two different parts has been found 
to vary with the method used.  In this paper we propose a method for defining the bounds on 
these measures.  Although recent contributions to the literature have investigated entry into 
the labor market and selectivity bias as additional reasons for the observation of large wage 
differentials this paper concentrates on the variation within the traditional Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition which for gender differences has recently been shown to be the most important 
element in the decomposition of wage differentials (for example see Madden 2000). 
This paper proceeds as follows.  First, we review the decomposition and the methods 
that have been proposed.  Second we define the method for bounding the non-discriminatory 
wage parameters.  Then we show how the measures of discrimination can be bounded.  In the 
fourth section we operationalize the use of the bounds by providing approximations to the 
asymptotic variances of the discrimination measures.  In Section five the bootstrap methods 
are defined for the estimation of the densities of the bounds on the discrimination measures.  
Section six defines a simple application using data that is widely available.     2
1.  Decomposition of Wage Differences 
Becker (1971) defined a measure of discrimination as the difference between the 
observed wage ratio and the wage ratio that would prevail in the absence of discrimination.  
This discrimination coefficient can be expressed as 
where  a W  is the average advantaged worker’s  wage in the market and  d W  is the average 
disadvantaged worker’s wage in the market.  It is straightforward to see that 
in the absence of discrimination and (2) follows from the usual cost minimization problem.  
Oaxaca (1973) introduced the formulation given in (1).  Following Oaxaca (1973), Cotton 
(1988) noted that (1) can be written in logarithmic form 
where the first term on the right hand side (the difference in the logs of the marginal products) 
is due to differences in productivity of the two groups and the second term on the right hand 
side (ln(δ+1)) is due to discrimination.  Oaxaca (1973) showed that separate linear models of 
the log wage specification can be estimated for disadvantaged or d’s ( ) ￿ ln( ) d d d  X W ′ = β and 
advantaged or a’s() ￿ ln( ) a a a    X W ′ = β .  The estimates can then be combined in the following 
way since regression lines must pass through the variables’ means: 
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The formulation given in (4) follows Neumark’s (1988) notation where   a X  and  d X  are 
vectors containing the means of the variables which are presumed to impact productivity (and 
subsequently wages) and  a ￿ β and  d ￿ β  are the estimated coefficients.  Empirical work using (4) 
has been done using two decompositions.  If  ad XXX ′ ′′ ∆= −  and ￿￿ ￿
ad ∆β=β −β , then (4) 
becomes either, 
or 
where (5) and (6) are found by adding ( ) ￿￿
dd aa X   X ′ ′ − β β  to (5) and adding () ￿￿
aa dd X   X ′′ − ββ   to 
(6).  The Oaxaca model decomposes the first term on the right hand side of (5) into the 
portion of the mean log wage differential due to differences in average productivity and the 
second term is due to different wage structures.  The β’s are given this interpretation since 
they reflect the returns that individuals will get from their personal characteristics with respect 
to wages.  Unfortunately, as Neumark (1988) (among others) has pointed out, considerable 
variation may exist in the estimate one gets of the wage differential due to discrimination if 
one uses (5) vis Æ vis (6).  Neumark (1988) presents a nice exposition on where the 
discrepancy lies in using (5) rather than (6) or vice versa.  If (5) is selected as the model to 
detect discrimination, it is assumed the advantaged worker’s wage structure becomes the one 
that would exist in the absence of discrimination.  In (6), the disadvantaged worker’s wage 
structure would be the prevailing one.  These cases are both straightforward to see since 
without discrimination (where the second term would disappear in (5)), we would attribute the 
mean wage difference to differences in characteristics weighted by the advantaged workers 
wage structure (βa).  Neumark (1988) made this point even clearer by generalizing Oaxaca’s 
result to get a broader decomposition: 
(5)      ￿ ￿ ln ( ) ln ( ) ad a d a  W WXX ′ ′ − =∆ + ∆ β β  
(6)      ￿ ￿ ln( ) ln( ) ad a d WW  X    X ′ ′ − =∆ + ∆ β β    4
where β
* is assumed to represent the wage structure that would prevail in the absence of 
discrimination.  Neumark (1988) shows that (5) or (6) can be generated as special cases of (7) 
and thus emphasizes the import of what one assumes about β
* in attempting to measure 
discrimination.  Cotton (1988) performed a similar analysis and argued that β
* should be 
constructed as a weighted average of advantaged and disadvantaged worker’s wages weighted 
by the ratio of the disadvantaged to the advantaged labor force representation.  Neumark 
(1988) rightly notes that this is an ad hoc specification and proposes finding β
* based on a 
more theoretical foundation. 
Specifically, Neumark (1988) assumes the employer derives utility from profits and 
from the discrimination-based composition of the labor force.  The utility function is assumed 
to be homogenous of degree zero with respect to the labor input.  This means that if the 
numbers of the two groups of workers are changed proportionately, utility is unchanged.  
Neumark interprets this to mean that employers only care about the relative proportions of the 
two types of workers.  Neumark’s model ultimately leads to, 
(where Na is the number of advantaged workers and Nd is the number of disadvantaged 
workers) or that the marginal product of the jth worker depends on the relative proportions of 
the various types of labor so that since Wj = MPj in the absence of discrimination, the non-
discrimination wage can be found from (8).  Neumark (1988) finds the estimator of the non-
discrimination wage structure (β
*) by first running regressions on the two sub-samples to get 
fitted log wage values and then after combining the fitted values of the log wages, by then 
running a regression on the whole sample.  Those coefficient estimates will then give an 
estimate of β
*.  One difficulty with the implementation of Neumark￿s method is that the 
(7)   ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ ln ( ) ln ( )
** *
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sample used in estimation may not refect the number of employees a particular employer has 
hired in each category.  It is quite common to apply these methods to data based on a 
sampling procedure that is not influenced by the employer￿s actions.  Neumark’s (1988) 
weighting procedure is similar to one used by Oaxaca and Ransom’s (O-R) (1988) which was 
used in the context of estimating union wage effects.  Oaxaca and Ransom (1991) also 
proposed a weighting matrix which was specified by 
where X is the observation matrix for the pooled (both classes of workers) sample and Xa is 
the observation matrix for the advantaged sample.  The interpretation of ΩN as a weighting 
matrix is readily seen by noting that aa dd XX =  X X  X X   ′ ′′ + , where Xd is the observation matrix 
for the disadvantaged sample. 
O-R showed that 
where 
* β  is the ordinary least squares estimator from the pooled sample (containing both 
types of workers.)  Thus, this weighting scheme was found by O-R to be the ordinary least 
squares estimator from the combined groups as the wage structure that would exist in the 
absence of discrimination.  They noted that this estimate of the common wage structure is not 
in general a convex, linear combination of the separately estimated advantaged and 
disadvantaged workers’ wage structures and they get a result similar to that of Neumark. 
As O-R note, Cotton’s (1988) weighting is equivalent to O-R’s when () ()
a N
N  XX ′  = 
() aa XX ′ , if the first and second sample moments are identical for all workers.  And because 
the sample mean characteristics for the advantaged and disadvantaged workers are the same, 
all of the differences in wages are due to discrimination.   
( 9 )       
1 (( ) ) N aa   X  X  XX
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(10)       ( )
*
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To summarize the literature on the establishment of a hypothetical ideal (with no 
advantage or disadvantage given) wage structure (β
*) we summarize the findings in Table 1 in 
which we have identified the various definitions of Ω as proposed in previous research. 
  We now propose a different method for determining the extent to which the definition 
of β
* matters on the resulting definition of discrimination. 
2.   Bounding β
* 
Leamer￿s 1978 monograph proposes a method for the determination of the fragility of a 
regression result.  This is done by subjecting regression models to an analysis that determines 
the extreme bounds (EB) of parameter estimates based on the assumption of a prior 
distribution for selected parameters.  In the usual application this is interpreted as a means for 
the comparison of all possible regression model specifications in which various subsets of 
regressors are considered for omission from the regression.  The most widely cited example 
of this form of analysis can be found in Leamer￿s 1983 paper entitled ￿Let￿s take the con out 
of econometrics￿.  Subsequently a number of papers have appeared that have criticized the EB 
approach to model specification analysis most notably McAleer Pagan and Volker (1985) as 
focusing on a very narrow type of specification choices and for the tendency for these 
analysis to reject too many models to be of much use.  However, a resurgence of applications 
and modifications of Leamer￿s EB analysis have appeared in Levine and Renelt (1992), 
Gawande (1995), and Temple (2000) among a number of others.  In this paper we do not use 
the EB analysis per say in that we do not investigate the implications of regression 
specification changes.  However, we use one of the fundamental results on which EB analysis 
is based which allows us to define a bound all the possible parameter estimates that may be 
used for the nondiscriminatory wage structure.  Then we solve an optimization problem that 
allows us to define two nondiscriminatory wage structures.  One that will maximize the 
measure of discrimination and the other that will minimize the measure of discrimination.   7
Chamberlain and Leamer (1976) (C-L) consider the case of a vector β
* that can be 
defined as a matrix weighted average of two vectors  
(11)     () ( )
1 ￿￿ *
ad a ab d   =     + 
−
+ ββ β HH H H  
where the weighting matrices   and  ad HH  are positive definite symmetric.  In the applications 
they consider these two sets of parameters are identified in terms of a Bayesian estimator 
where one group would be identified as the data and the other as the prior with the resulting 
ideal or non-discriminatory set of parameters as the posterior and the H￿s are the 
corresponding precision matrixes (or inverse covariance matrixes).  Algebraically there is no 
distinction between the prior and the data though in practice Bayesian methods are often 
applied where detailed data distributions are defined but priors are non-informative.   
  In the case of the decompositions defined by  OR C ,   and  Ω ΩΩ  as defined in Table 1, we 
can set  a =Ω H  and  d =− Ω H Ι .  In the case of the Neumark decomposition  aa a XX ′ = H  and 
dd d XX ′ = H  and the resulting (posterior) mean vector of parameters is equivalent to the 
Bayesian interpretation of the OLS estimator when there is an addition of data.  Thus Xa 
would be added to Xd to form a total sample from which the estimate would be obtained. 
Where the matrix Ω is a positive definite symmetric matrix.  Consequently, wage 
decompositions provide an application of methods developed for the consideration of these 
linear Bayesian models.   
  From Theorem 2 C-L prove that the matrix weighted average (β
*) must lie within the 
ellipsoid defined by 
** ￿￿ () (   )     …     cc ′′ −− < ∆ β ∆ β ββ HH .  Where  ( ) ￿￿2 da c =β+ β  the 
arithmetic average of the parameter vectors and H is a sample precision matrix unique up to a 
scalar multiple.  This provides a constraint on the extreme values of β
* as: 
(12)  ( ) ￿￿ I -    
*
ad   =     +    ΩβΩ β β    8
Which implies that any possible value of β
* defined by the different values of Ω must be 
contained within or on the surface of this ellipsoid.  
From the relationship in (7) we have: 
ln ( ) ln ( ) ad         E   +   D   WW − =  
where: 
(14)     ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿
* *
ad a d D                XX   =− + β −β β β ′′   
D is the difference in the log wages that is attributable to the differential payment schedule 
that is often referred to as ￿discrimination￿.  Where the term  ( ) ￿
*
a a   X −β β ′  measures the over 
compensation paid to the advantaged group and  ( ) ￿ *
d d    X −β β ′  measures the under 
compensation paid to the disadvantaged group. 
(15)    
* E X   ′ =∆ β  
E is the difference that is due to the differences in the worker￿s characteristics/human capital 
which is referred to as ￿endowment￿.  We can solve for the value of 
* β  as the value that either 
maximizes or minimizes D.  By implication, since  ln( ) W ∆  remains constant, minimizing D  
maximizes E and maximizing D is equivalent to minimizing E.  Thus we solve the following 
optimization problem: 
Where we use the full sample cross products matrix  XX ′ as the sample precision matrix H or 
the appropriate inverse of the heteroscedastic consistent covariance matrix.  The constrained 
optimization can then be defined by a Lagrangian of the form: 
(13)     
** ￿￿ () () …  c  c      ′′ −− = ∆ β ∆ β ββ HH  
(16)  ( )
** ￿￿ Max/Min   ,  st  (  ) (  )  =  …
* EX  c c ′′ ′ = ∆− − ∆ β ∆ β ββ β HH  
(17)  ( )
** ￿￿ () () …
* L = X     c c ′′ ′ ∆ −λ − − − ∆β ∆β ββ β HH    9
The first order derivatives of L with respect to β
* and λ are given as: 
We can solve (18) for the optimal value of β
* (
* ￿ β ) by setting this expression equal to zero and 
we get: 
then substituting 
1 ￿ c X
− +ρ ∆ H  for 
* ￿ β  into (19) which is also set to equal to zero we can solve 
for  ￿ ρ where we get two solution vectors  
(21)       !
1
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  Then two solutions for the optimal β
* are found to be: 
(22) 
* 1 ￿ β i i= c X
− + γφ ∆ H  
where  1 1 γ= and  2 1 γ= −. 
The second order conditions can be established by evaluating the matrix of second 
derivatives evaluated at each solution as: 
Because the precision matrix () H  is a positive definite matrix and  ￿ 0 φ > , β
*
1 will be the 
maximum of E  and the minimum of D and β
*
2 will be the minimum value of E and the 
maximum of D and we can determine the bounds on the possible values of the measure of 
discrimination.  Note that when βd = βa then β
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3.    Bounds on the measure of discrimination (D). 
  The extreme values of 
*
i β  can now be used to define the extreme values of the 
discrimination measure (D) which we will denote as 
*
i D .  From the definitions above we have 
that 
** ￿ ￿ ln( ) ii D WX ′ =∆ −∆ β  or by substitution this can be shown to be: 
(24)    
** ￿ ￿ ln( ) ii D WX ′ = ∆− ∆ β  
Thus  
(25)    
*1 ￿￿ ￿ ln( ) ‰ ii D WX c X X
− ′′ ′ = ∆− ∆ − γ ∆ β ∆ β ∆ ∆ HH  
recall that  1 1 γ= and  2 1 γ =− .  Thus the difference between the limiting values of the 
discrimination measure is given by  
(26)    
** 1
21 ￿￿ ￿￿ D DX X
− ′′ − =∆ β∆ β∆ ∆ HH  
which is a weighted function of differences in the vector of parameters ( ￿ ∆β) and ( X ∆ ).  Thus 
the greater the difference in the parameters or the greater the difference in the discrimination 
measures the larger the span of values one might obtain from any discrimination measure 
employed.   
The measure D can also be shown to be directly related to the measure of discrimination 
defined in (1) as δ.  From the relationship in (7)  and (14) and (15) we have: 
(27)     ln
a
d





If we are interested in removing the influence of the differences in endowments, or 
equivalently making the assumption that  ad MPM P =  we can concentrate on the value of D. 
(28)     ln
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or equivalently:   11
(29)     () exp
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as the ratio of the average wage for the advantaged group to the disadvantaged group.  And 
we define: 











by equation (1).    Thus we have that: 
(31)     exp( ) 1 D δ= −  
Or that δ is a monotonic function of D and the maximization of D will coincide with the 
maximum of δ and the minimization of D is also the minimum value ofδ.  Note that when 
.3 D <  the approximation that  D δ≈  can be used.   
  We can define the estimate of δ using any particular definition of 
* ￿ β as: 
(32)    
* ￿ ￿ exp 1 ii  D   δ= −    
  In order to use the estimated values of D and 
* β to make inferences we need to be able 
to make probability statements concerning their estimates.  A first step in making these 
inferences is the derivation of an estimate for their variances.  
4.  The asymptotic variance of  ￿ D and  ￿* β  
  In a companion paper to their 1994 paper Oaxaca and Ransom (1998) present the 
methodology for the computation of the variances used in their earlier paper.  The technique 
they employ is an application of the widely used ￿delta method￿ in which a first order Taylor 
series expansion is used to linearize D.  In this section we also apply the delta method but we 
consider not only the estimated parameters but in a difference from Oaxaca and Ransom we 
also assume that the means of the characteristics of each group are stochastic as well.  Thus D 
is defined in terms of four random vectors ( ,  ￿￿ , , and   ad a d XX ββ ) for which we can define   12
estimates of their covariances.  By stacking these four vectors we define a vector of length 4k 
given as θwhich is defined as: 







  ′′′′′ =β β   θ  
Where the covariance of  ￿ θis defined as Ψ and we can define this covariance as: 








 Φ  =  Σ







The estimates of  i Σ are the covariances of the means of the attributes for each group and the 
() ￿ cov ii Φ= β  is the appropriate estimator of the parameter covariance matrix which may need 
to be corrected to account for heteroskedasticity, a commonly encountered problem in the 
estimation of wage equations, or may be the product of a maximum likelihood estimation in 
the case that the earnings data are not provided in continuous records. 
  In order to estimate the variance of the measure of discrimination we use the delta 
method which results in: 
(35)     "()
￿￿ () () ￿ ￿ var
DD
D
′    ∂ θ∂ θ
=    ∂θ∂ θ   
Ψ  
Consequently this estimate requires the definition of the gradient of D with respect to the 
parameters in θ.  For the previously defined set of discrimination measures defined in 
Section 1 of this paper, as determined by the weighting matrix Ω (as summarized in Table 1), 
we find the following estimate of the variance:   13
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In the case of the extreme values of D that we have derived in Section 2 we do not define a 
unique value for the weighting matrix Ω.  Thus 
* β  is not a linear function of the parameter 
estimates for each case ( ￿
a β  and  ￿
d β ) consequently we need to derive a different expression for 
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again where  1 1 γ= and  2 1 γ= −.   
  In addition, we can define the approximate covariance of both of the extreme value 
parameters (
**
12 ￿￿  and  ββ ), as defined in equation (22) as: 
(38)  
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5.    Bootstrapping standard errors and confidence intervals for D 
  An alternative to constructing the Wald tests using the approximate variances defined in 
(37) and (38) is to employ Efron￿s (1982) bootstrap to construct alternative standard error 
estimates and confidence intervals that are not based on any particular distribution.  The 
bootstrap has been applied in the computation of discrimination measures most notably by 
Silber and Weber (1999) where they compare the values for the discrimination measures 
defined in Table 1 for the differences between ￿Easterners￿ and ￿Westerners￿ in the Israeli 
labor market.   
  The bootstrap involves the recomputation of multiple values of the coefficients of 
interest 
** ￿ ￿ (  and  ) ii D β  by drawing with replacement from the data used.  Since Efron￿s original 
contribution a number of enhancements have been proposed to the bootstrap methodology.  In 
difference to Silber and Weber who employ the naive percentile approach on the measure of 
discrimination, we follow Horowitz￿s (2001) advice to base the bootstrap only on a pivot 
statistic.  We use a conditional bootstrap for the regression coefficients as proposed in 
Freedman and Peters (1984) in which the model is assumed but the regression errors are 
sampled with replacement.  The confidence intervals are constructed using a bootstrap-t 
technique as described in Efron and Tibshirani (1993) which is equivalent to using the 
asymptotic t-statistic as our pivot.  The sampling with replacement is conducted using a 
second-order balanced resample method proposed by Davison, Hinkley and Schechtman 
(1986).  This means that the average characteristics of each group ( and  ad XX ) are both 
resampled using the same sample as the residuals used to recompute the parameter estimates 
( ￿￿  and  ad ββ ).  In addition, these samples are drawn in such a way to insure that the frequency 
of choosing each observation is equal.   15
  In the case of the measures of discrimination D we use the t-ratio of the estimate to the 
estimated standard error as defined in (36) and (37) to form the appropriate pivot statistic.  A 
statistic defined as a t-statistic is computed for each bootstrap simulation which is defined as: 
(39)   ( ) " ￿￿ ￿ var( ) bb b tD D D =−  
where the  ￿
b D  denotes the estimated discrimination measure for bootstrap simulation (b) and 
￿ D is the point estimate based on the data.  These statistics are then rescaled to generate a 
bootstrap-t value of the discrimination measure designated as  b D #  which is defined as: 
(40)   " ( ) ￿￿ var( ) bb D tD D = + #  
6.  A Simple Example 
The differences in average wages for men and women in the US has been well 
documented.  A number of papers have shown how this differential has changed over time in 
the US indicating that the differential has been decreasing over time (see Polachek and Robust 
2001).  The example we use here computes the various measures of discrimination as we have 
defined in the context of males as the advantaged group and women as the disadvantaged 
group.  We use a small random subset of the 1985 Current Population Survey (245 women 
and 289 men) from Berndt(1991) ( CPS85 from the data for chapter 5).  Two regressions are 
estimated by gender, with the log of income as the dependent variable and the years of 
education and potential experience (as approximated by the number of years since left school) 
as the independent variables.  The mean and standard deviation of the data are listed in Table 
2.  The regression parameter estimates are listed in Table 3.  From these regressions we find 
that men are compensated at almost double the rate for their potential experience than women 
(.0163 versus .0089) although education seems to be better accounted for in women.  
In Table 4 we list the various measures of discrimination (in terms of the log of the 
income).  The differences of the means of the log of wages which includes both the   16
endowment differences and the difference attributable to discrimination is found to be .2313.  
From the rest of the rows in Table 4 we find that all of the point estimates of the measures of 
discrimination are larger than this value which would indicate that the endowment has a 
negative effect on the wage difference.  This table includes the point estimate in the 3 column 
and the approximate standard error in column 4.  In addition, we have included the 
bootstrapped values of the mean, standard error, and the 95% confidence bounds.  Note that 
for the traditional measures of discrimination the Dd to Dn measures the point estimate and the 
mean of the bootstrap estimates are very close indicating little bias.  Also the asymptotic 
standard error estimates are almost exactly equal to the bootstrap values.  In the bootstraps 
performed here we used 10,000 replications once we determined that more replications did 
not effect the results obtained to any significant degree. 
Table 5 lists the extreme bounds for the parameter estimates 
* () i β  along with the 
asymptotic standard error estimates.  We see that the non-discriminatory wage parameters that 
maximize the discrimination are those that result in parameters for potential experience that 
are small and for which we could not reject the hypothesis that they are equal to zero.  And 
for the minimum set of non-discriminatory parameters are those that have the greatest 
parameter for the influence of potential experience and for education as well.  In the last two 
rows of Table 4 we list the discrimination measures based on the bounds of the non-
discriminatory wage parameters 
* () i β .  Note that 
**
12 [] da D DDD < →< , the upper and lower 
bound estimates act as the limits on the estimates of the all the alternative discrimination 
measures.  In this example, the extreme measures the asymptotic and bootstrap values differ 
more than for the other measures.  The average of the bootstrapped values indicates that the 
point estimate of 
*
1 D  (based on the minimum for the discrimination measure) may be 
positively biased and 
*
2 D  (based on the maximum for the discrimination measure) may be 
negatively biased, though in neither case is the estimated bias more than 5%.  From the   17
bootstrapped confidence intervals we find that the 2.5% lower bound for the minimum value 
of the discrimination measure is .1545 and the 97.5% upper bound for the maximum of the 
discrimination measure is .3700.  Thus we can bound the estimate of the discrimination 
measure although these probability statements ignore the probability of choice between the 
two extremes and any variation that may be due to alternative model specifications. 
An equivalent method for demonstrating the probability bounds for the discrimination 
measure is by examining the density of the two extreme measures.  Figure 1 displays two 
kernel density estimates as determined by the 10,000 studentized bootstrap values for each 
measure.  Note that the density estimate for the lower bound appears to be estimated with 
greater precision than the upper bound as was the case for the bootstrapped variance estimate 
as borne out by the bootstrap estimate of the standard deviation for 
*
1 D  as opposed to the 
standard deviation estimate for 
*
2 D .  However it is apparent from this figure that the 
examination of the minimum discrimination measure results in an unambiguous conclusion 
that discrimination is non-zero in this case.  In other words we could reject the hypothesis that 
discrimination was zero with a very low probability of making an error.  Thus by using the 
minimum measure of discrimination and the lowest bound we still find that discrimination is 
positive. 
A caveat for this application is in order.  The model specification may create a larger 
degree of measured discrimination due to the lack of more detail as to education type, 
occupation, characteristics of the employer, family circumstances, and the proxy for 
experience.  In particular, the use of potential experience alone for both men and women is 
probably responsible for increasing the measured discrimination due to the inadequacy of this 
variable to account for the differential in accumulated human capital that has been shown to 
explain such a large proportion of the gender wage gap (see Polachek 1995).  Filer (1993) 
demonstrates empirically that this is an inappropriate proxy for a comparable experience   18
measure for both men and women by demonstrating how other proxies change the gender 
differentials in coefficients.  Specifically potential experience does not account for potential 
gaps in experience which are more prevalent for married women and women with children 
than for men.  By measuring less actual experience for women than for men it is expected that 
the parameter in a wage equation would be less as well. 
7.   Conclusions 
  It is well known that the various wage differential decompositions traditionally done in 
analyzing discrimination rely heavily on the assumption regarding the non discrimination 
wage structure β
* (see equation (7)).  Several authors have attempted to motivate the 
specification of this "no discrimination" wage structure based on the objective function of the 
employer in practicing discriminatory behaviour.  The purpose of this paper has been to show 
that the wage structure that would prevail in the absence of discrimination can in fact be 
bounded when we assume that the information to establish this wage structure is a weighted 
average of the wage structure for the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups.  Based on a 
theorem from  Chamberlain and Leamer (1976) we showed in this paper that the non-
discrimination wage parameters (β
*) must lie within an ellipsoid defined by the data and the 
regression results for each group.  By using this method we are able to select the β
* which will 
maximize (minimize) the level of the discrimination in the labor market.   
  In addition to deriving the formulas for the estimated parameters for the non-
discrimination wage structure that minimizes the level of discrimination we also specify the 
approximate standard errors.  The point estimate and the approximate standard errors can be 
used to define a pivot statistic which can be used to bootstrap the discrimination measures.  
Thus it is possible to construct an estimate of the density of the discrimination measures 
which can then be used to make probability statements concerning the presence of 
discrimination.  In the example used here we found that the measure of discrimination that   19
was constructed was unambiguously positive as defined by the distribution of both the 
minimum discrimination measure. 
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Table 1   The proposed values of the weighting matrix Ω. 
 
Weighting Matrix  Author 
 


















Table 2  The characteristics of the simple example. 
 
Gender Variable  Mean  SD
natural logarithm of average 
hourly earnings 
2.165 0.534
potential years of experience 
(AGE-ED-6) 
16.965 12.135
Men  (289 obs) 
years of education  13.014  2.768
natural logarithm of average 
hourly earnings 
1.934 0.492
potential years of experience 
(AGE-ED-6)  
18.833 12.613
Women  (245 obs) 
years of education  13.024  2.429
 
 
Table 3  Result of simple model regression 
 
Gender Variable  ￿ β   SE t-statistic 
(Constant) 0.7128 0.1614  4.4168





2=.232, ￿ σ=.469) 
years of education  0.0903 0.0107  8.4298
(Constant) 0.3110 0.1771  1.7564
potential years of 




2=.262, ￿ σ=.423) 
years of education  0.1117 0.0119  9.3859
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Table 4.  Measures of discrimination with bootstrapped statistics based on simple model. 
 
 
Bootstrapped values  Variable Reference 
Parameters 
Est Asymptotic 
Std Dev,  Mean Std  Dev  2.5%  97.5% 
ln( ) Y ∆    .2313 .0446 .2313 .0452  .1456  .3182
Dd  ￿
d β   .2491 .0396 .2491 .0399 .1737  .3257
Dr  () ￿￿ ‰ ad β+ β   .2559 .0391 .2559 .0394 .1812  .3321
Da  ￿
d β   .2627 .0397 .2627 .0401 .1866  .3402
Dc  ( ) () ￿￿
aa dd a d nn n n β+ β +   .2565 .0392 .2565 .0394 .1816  .3327
Dn  ￿ β  .2543 .0391 .2543 .0392 .1800  .3302
*
1 D  
*
1 β   .2327 .0549 .2287 .0437 .1545  .3025
*
2 D  
*
2 β   .2790 .0473 .2831 .0462 .2005  .3700
 
Table 5  Extreme Bounds comparison parameter estimates ( ￿*
i β ) 
 
 
Bound Variable  ￿ β   SE (asy)  t-statistic 
(Constant)  0.0867 0.3950 0.2195
potential years of 
experience (AGE-ED-6)  0.0229 0.0044  5.2631
Min of D (
*
1 ￿ β ) 
years of education  0.1196 0.0284 4.2095
(Constant)  0.9367 0.3970 2.3596
potential years of 
experience (AGE-ED-6)  0.0023 0.0042 0.5472
Max of D (
*
2 ￿ β ) 
years of education  0.0825 0.0286 2.8805
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Figure 1.  A comparison of the estimated densities of the t-bootstrapped values of 
*
1 D  and 
*
2 D  